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Pourquoi L'AMNA concerne les ouvriers: négociations, implications décisionnelles, et réactions du mouvement syndical

Esther Busser

Résumé

Les négociations de Doha entreprises par l'OMC comprennent entre autres un mandat de réduire les droits de douane des produits non agricoles. Il s'agit des négociations sur l'AMNA (accès aux marchés pour les produits non agricoles). Le présent article évalue l'impact des propositions de réductions tarifaires sur les taux consolidés ou appliqués de 13 pays en développement, décomposés par secteur industriel. L'auteur étudie aussi les effets sur l'emploi des négociations sur l'AMNA, et les implications des réductions tarifaires sur les politiques de développement industriel. Elle prône le besoin d'utiliser une approche différenciée dans les négociations sur l'AMNA, étant donné les différentes structures tarifaires et industrielles des pays en développement, ainsi que le besoin d'offrir plus de flexibilité pour protéger certains secteurs exigeants en main d'œuvre ou potentiellement créateurs d'emplois productifs. Étant donné l'impact sur l'emploi des propositions de réductions, la dernière section de l'article examine différentes stratégies utilisées par les syndicats en ce qui touche les négociations sur l'AMNA, et recommande un engagement des mouvements syndicaux qui puisse consolider leurs capacités de recherche et d'étude des impacts, et appuyer les interventions stratégiques des syndicats de divers niveaux.

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Why NAMA is a Trade Union Issue: Negotiations, Policy Implications and Trade Union Responses

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Abstract

The WTO Doha negotiations include a mandate for the reduction of tariffs of non-agricultural products, the so-called NAMA (Non-Agricultural Market Access) negotiations. This article assesses the impact of the negotiating proposals for tariff reductions on the bound and applied tariffs of 13 developing countries, disaggregated by industrial sector. It further looks at employment effects of the NAMA negotiations and the policy implications of tariff reductions for industrial development. The article argues for the need to use a differentiated approach in NAMA negotiations given the differences in tariff structure and industrial structure of developing countries, as well as for the need to provide more flexibilities to shield certain labour-intensive sectors and sectors that have a potential to create productive employment. Given the employment effects of the proposals the last section of the article looks at different trade union strategies that have been used with regard to the NAMA negotiations, and makes recommendations for trade union engagement that could enhance both the research and impact assessment capacities of trade unions as well as the strategic interventions by trade unions of various levels.

Introduction

The Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) have caused great concern for the international trade union movement and, in particular, to trade unions in a number of developing countries that are facing demands for very high tariff cuts. Given the seriousness of the effects these demands will have, especially based on a Swiss formula with low coefficients and few exemptions, responses have been developed in different countries and at different levels. The Swiss formula is a non-linear formula, which reduces higher tariffs (i.e. developing country tariffs) much more

than lower tariffs[2]. The coefficient in the formula effectively caps the bound tariffs of countries. The effects of the tariff reductions at proposed levels will be twofold. On the one hand, such liberalization will lead to job losses and adjustment, whereas on the other hand future industrialization could be seriously compromised and therefore threaten the potential for decent work and the creation of productive employment. Given the global decent work challenge and support for the decent work agenda, as stated by governments at the United Nations World Summit in New York in September 2005 and the high level segment of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) meeting in Geneva in July 2006, the current NAMA proposals are not at all responding to these challenges.

This article describes the negotiating mandate of NAMA and the most important developments in NAMA negotiations, as well as the current state of the negotiations. It also focuses on the implications of tariff reductions for developing countries, based on the tariff simulations for 13 developing countries at a sectoral level. The countries that have been selected are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Tunisia and Uruguay. Simulations are based on tariff reductions through a Swiss formula with a coefficient of 15 and a coefficient of 30. The results are presented per sector: textiles, clothing, leather, footwear, chemicals, wood products, paper products, fabricated metals, plastic products, rubber products, automobiles, furniture and machinery. Both the reductions in bound tariffs and applied tariffs are analyzed and show substantial tariff reductions for most of the selected countries and for many of the selected sectors.

The article further focuses on the effects of tariff reductions on employment using studies conducted by UNCTAD and the Carnegie Endowment which examine the employment effects of NAMA negotiations under different scenarios. Some results and effects of previous liberalization processes on employment are also presented. The article demonstrates the importance of tariffs as an instrument for industrial development and explores the consequences of proposed NAMA tariff reductions for industrial development. The serious effects of NAMA proposals on both current and future employment in developing countries require a strong trade union response. The article looks at trade union responses to NAMA, both at the international and national

level, and seeks to address the issue of effectiveness of responses and ways to improve responses, and concludes with a number of recommendations for trade unions.

The NAMA Mandate and NAMA Negotiations

The NAMA negotiations cover a wide range of non-agricultural goods, including fish and forestry products. They aim to reduce tariffs of industrial products, as well as non-tariff barriers such as technical standards and health and safety standards (See also WTO Doha Mandate Paragraph 16[3]). The NAMA negotiations should be seen in the broader context of the Doha Development Round, as set out in Paragraph 2 of the Dpha Mandate, which puts the interests and needs of developing countries at the heart of the Doha Work Program[4].

The NAMA negotiations are based on the so-called July framework, which was adopted in July 2004, despite opposition from developing countries, in particular the G-90 countries (Africa, Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Africa Caribbean Pacific (ACP) countries). In Hong Kong, the framework was further refined and a decision was taken to use a Swiss formula, with more than one coefficient. This Swiss formula effectively caps tariffs at certain levels and requires reductions on all tariff lines. These caps are determined by the coefficient. The lower the coefficient, the lower the maximum tariff level for all tariff lines and the higher the tariff reductions. Moreover, higher tariffs are reduced much more than lower tariffs.

The current negotiations mainly pit the European Union (EU) and United States (US) against the NAMA 11 group, which consists of Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, South Africa, Namibia, Tunisia, Egypt, India, Indonesia and the Philippines, and is led by South Africa. The EU proposal of October 2005 tables a coefficient of 10 for developed countries and a maximum coefficient of 15 for developing countries. The US proposal of June 2006 proposes a difference between the coefficient of developed and developing countries of less than 5 points. In response to this proposal, the NAMA 11 group proposed a difference between the two coefficients of at least 25 points. This implies that if the developed countries apply a coefficient of 10 then developing countries would have to apply a coefficient of 35.

The effects of the EU and US proposals on tariff reductions in developing countries will, however, be substantial. Not

only will these tariff reductions have consequences for the quantity and quality of employment, but they will also determine the future development prospects of the countries and therefore have long term implications that need careful consideration.

Tariff Simulations

Tariff reductions in NAMA are to take place on the basis of reductions in bound tariffs[5]. However, in practice, the tariffs that are applied in many developing countries are often much lower than these bound rates due to previous autonomous liberalization, preferential trade agreements or structural adjustment programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Therefore, in order to get new market access, high tariff cuts in bound rates will have to be made in order to get effective reductions in applied rates[6]. However, such high reductions in bound tariffs will have severe consequences for the level of bound tariffs and will therefore have substantial policy implications. It is further assumed that the current level of applied tariffs is the appropriate level, which might not necessarily be the case[7].

Tariff simulations so far have not looked at the sectoral impacts, and therefore just give an aggregate result, which prevents the identification of sensitive sectors and an estimation of real impacts in these sectors. This section brings together the results of tariff simulations on a sectoral basis of tariff cuts undertaken based on two scenarios, one is a Swiss formula with a coefficient of 15, and the second one is a Swiss formula with a coefficient of 30. The simulations were undertaken on the basis of tariff information provided by the Market Access Map database[8]. Table 1 shows the average applied and bound rates in selected countries and sectors.

Many countries have substantial gaps (water) between bound and applied tariffs, but this amount of "water" differs from sector to sector and from country to country. In particular, South Africa has a much lower level of bound rates than the other countries and has applied rates that are close to the bound rates. At the sectoral level, sectors such as textiles and clothing, automobile and furniture are among the sectors that have less "water" between the applied and bound tariffs.

A Swiss formula with a coefficient of 15 will reduce bound tariffs from an average of 30% to a level within a range of 9% to 12% for all sectors (Table 2). These are reductions of up to

70%. This is a very high reduction compared to the average target of 27% in the Uruguay Round (TWN, 2005) and a probable average reduction of 36% in agriculture tariffs[9] for developing countries. Moreover, this is a very low level for industrial tariffs in order to diversify and expand industrial production.

A Swiss formula with a coefficient of 15 will also result in reductions in applied tariffs for the selected sectors and countries (Table 3). The percentage reductions in applied rates are substantial, especially in sectors such as textiles, clothing, leather, footwear, plastic products, rubber products, automobile and furniture in almost all countries, with reductions in some cases of up to 70%. Wood and paper products are particularly affected in three of the African countries. A Swiss formula with a coefficient of 30 shows reductions in bound tariffs on average of around 50%, with new bound tariffs at levels of around 15% for most sectors (Table 4). No increase beyond this new bound level will be possible if this coefficient is applied.

The scenario of a Swiss formula with a coefficient of 30 shows similar results as a coefficient of 15 (Table 5). In most countries the same sectors can be identified that will face reductions in applied rates and that will be particularly affected such as textiles, clothing, leather, footwear, automobile and furniture. There will be reductions of up to 66% in some applied rates. Jobs in these sectors are likely to be at stake. Countries that will be most affected are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Morocco, South Africa, Tunisia and Uruguay.

Many jobs in developing countries are at stake in the NAMA negotiations. Table 6 shows the employment figures per sector for the 13 countries. These figures represent formal employment and make up an important share of overall formal employment. Most countries are already confronted with high unemployment and underemployment rates. A further reduction in formal jobs, which are characterized by a certain level of worker protection and income, would represent a major loss as such jobs are crucial in the fight against poverty and unemployment and in achieving the objective of decent work for all.

Textiles and clothing, auto, plastic, and furniture will be particularly affected by the tariff reductions. The charts below (ITUC, 2007) show the reductions in bound and applied tariffs for these five sectors under the scenario of a Swiss formula with a coefficient of 15.[10]

Table 1: Textiles



Table 2: Clothing



Table 3: Automobile



Table 4: Furniture



Table 5: Plastics



Employment Impacts

Two studies have examined the employment effects of NAMA negotiations under different Doha (Swiss formula) scenarios. Although there are serious shortcomings in the models used by these studies and the assumptions made in these models, they do provide some insight into the direction and level of the impacts of NAMA negotiations. A study by Vanzetti and Santiago de Córdoba (2005) looks at the implications of tariff liberalization in developing countries, using a global CGE model, the

Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)[11] model. The study presents the results of ten different liberalizing scenarios. Under the Swiss ambitious scenario, one of the main outcomes in terms of employment is that the use of unskilled labour, which is mostly engaged in leather, lumber, paper products, apparel, light manufactures and electronics, will increase but the increase is small in response to liberalization. Sectors that are sensitive to the use of labour and to changes in the use of labour due to liberalization are textiles, apparel, leather and motor vehicles. Changes in total employment differ from country to country and from sector to sector and also depend on the level of ambition of the formula (i.e. the level of tariff reductions). However, substantial changes in labour use may take place.

A study, undertaken by the Carnegie Endowment (Polaski, 2006), which also uses a GTAP model, simulates a number of scenarios. The ambitious Doha manufacturing scenario, with a reduction in applied rates of 33% in developing countries (Table 7), shows that most regions will gain, particularly China and some other South and East Asian countries. The Middle East and North African countries will experience gains as well, and to a lesser extent gains are realised by most Latin American countries as well as South Africa. Net losers from manufacturing liberalization will be Bangladesh and East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Although on average gains are realised they do result in changes which will have substantial adjustment costs in the countries concerned. Such costs are ignored in general equilibrium models and the report acknowledges that "[a]s a result of omitting these costs, applied general equilibrium models tend to systematically overstate the net gains from trade or understate the net losses" (Polaski, 2006: 54).

With regard to gains and losses of world export market share for developing countries under scenario 6 of NAMA, with a reduction in manufacturing tariffs for developing countries of 24%, the study shows that losses in labour intensive sectors will be found in South Asia (except India), the Middle East and North Africa, Bangladesh, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and the rest of Latin America, South Africa and the rest of Sub Saharan Africa (Polaski, 2006: 27).

The report argues that "though the liberalization of manufactured goods increases the demand for labour in the developing world (with the exception of the poorest countries), wages for

unskilled labour do not increase, because of both the abundant supply of labour and the fact that liberalized trade in labour intensive manufactures drives down world prices for such goods and returns to workers and firms in those sectors" (Polaski, 2006: 43). The report further notes that "significant increases in unskilled employment (from 0.6 to 1.4%) are realised by China, Indonesia, the rest of ASEAN and India. Once again, the three poorest regions in the model (Bangladesh, East Africa and the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa) actually lose unskilled jobs from manufacturing industries" (Polaski, 2006: 43). Furthermore, shifts in production will take place due to liberalization but the report notes that these shifts remain small, except for sectors such as metals, motor vehicles, electronics and machinery where the redistribution of production will be more significant (Polaski, 2006: 47-48).

Past liberalization also demonstrates that tariff reductions have substantial effects on employment. Research by Buffie (2001) presents results from trade liberalization in African countries, all with severe effects on employment, while Latin America liberalization in the 1990s has led to large formal job losses and the increasing underemployment in Peru, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Brazil.

UNCTAD country studies (Laird, 2006) from Malawi, Zambia, Brazil, Jamaica, Bangladesh, India, the Philippines and Bulgaria examine the impact of liberalization. In particular, the rapid growth of imports of industrial products led to the closure of some local industries and to stagnation or low growth in industrial jobs. For example, in Zambia, tariff reductions led to job losses, due to relocations and closures. Formal employment fell from 23 per cent over the period 1981–1990 to an average of 12 per cent during 1991–2000 and to 8.1 per cent in 2003. Countries like Malawi and Jamaica also showed a decline in the manufacturing sector and in employment. The study on India showed that "wages, as a proportion of total value added, have fallen for all manufacturing because of increased capitalization and use of higher technologies, attributable to the lowering of tariffs on capital goods" as well as because of the growth of employment in the informal economy and increased casualization of employment (Laird, 2006: 176-177).

Both the tariff simulation research and the evidence from previous experiences with trade liberalization illustrate the likelihood that liberalization will have negative effects on employ-

ment. At the same time, negotiations continue in a manner in which the exact impacts of the tariff reductions on job losses is not known, the gender dimension of job losses is not known, where no mechanisms for adjustment are in place in the countries concerned, and where job shifting to other sectors is questionable, given previous experiences, with workers likely to end up unemployed given the already high unemployment and underemployment levels, or in informal employment and casual or precarious employment relationships.

Industrial Policy

Tariffs are used creatively to develop and diversify industries and supply capacities as developing countries undergo various stages of development. Akyüz (2005a) describes this industrialization process as follows: "The early stages are characterized by sectoral specialization in exploiting endowments of natural resources and unskilled labour. This is followed by diversification into a wide spectrum of technologically more advanced activities, accompanied by increased internal integration through a dense set of linkages among sectors. With industrial maturity there is again a move towards sectoral specialization, this time at the top end of the technology ladder" (Akyüz: 2005a: 20). Shafaeddin (2006) stresses the importance of an industrial and trade policy but specifies that such policies need to be selective, performance based, mixed, dynamic and predictable. The successes of industrialized countries confirm such a selective approach and tariffs and the flexibility to raise and lower tariffs play an important role in this process (Shafaeddin: 18-19).

Chang notes that "[a]s a country climbs up the ladder of international division of labour, tariff protection needs to go down in some of the old infant industries that have now matured, while protection needs to be accorded to new emerging infant industries" (Chang, 2005: 97). He is critical of the current NAMA proposals and argues that if tariffs are to be cut and bound as is promoted by developed countries within the NAMA negotiations, this sort of flexibility, crucial to developing economies, will no longer exist (Chang: 97).

Similarly, Khor and Goh (2006) note that "what is of relatively greater importance [in the negotiations] to developing countries is the maintenance and development of their industrial sector, which means more industrial output, better technology and

more manufacturing jobs" (Khor: 9). They also argue for modalities in NAMA to allow for policy space and for developing countries the flexibility to be able to modify their tariff levels. They argue for this on the basis of two examples, one is the need to be able to change tariffs over time when moving up from low tech to high-tech products. The second one is the need for developing countries to be able to ration out their limited foreign exchange earnings for the import of essential products.

Tariffs can also be used to develop industries in early phases of production, when industries lack competitiveness. This is particularly the case in developing countries as described by Chang (2005). Developing countries need to develop new industries in order to diversify and upgrade their economies so that they can achieve higher living standards (Chang, 2005: 94). He also criticizes the lack of flexibility in the NAMA proposals and argues that countries should be allowed to unbind and raise their tariffs, if they have reasonable grounds, for example if adjustment costs turn out to be too high after the implementation of tariff cuts (Chang, 2005: 96).

The importance of tariffs can be shown by the fact that developed countries have used tariffs at the initial stages of development. Both Shafaeddin (2006: 13) and Rodrik (2001: 22) refer to the use of tariffs by developed economies and newly industrialized economies. Except for Hong Kong, no country has industrialized without infant-industry protection and they all have used trade barriers in one way or another to build their industries. In this context, Akyüz notes that developing countries' applied tariffs are already very low compared to their income levels. Both the Western European core economies and the US used higher applied rates and industrial protection when they had similar per capita income levels as Brazil, China and India today (Akyüz, 2005a: 13).

Besides this need for tariff policy, other instruments for industrial development are becoming increasingly limited. Rodrik notes that countries such as Korea and Taiwan protected their industries by providing export subsidies, the use of reverse-engineering of foreign patented products, and the use of performance requirements like export-import balance requirements and domestic content requirements on foreign investors. The current WTO rules now severely restrict the use of all such measures (Rodrik, 2001: 19).

Akyüz also refers to the increasingly limited options available to developing countries pursuing industrial development. He admits that tariff protection is not always the optimal policy instrument to promote industrialization but many other policy options that were used by developed and more advanced developing economies in the past are already restricted by WTO agreements like the agreement on subsidies, commitments on intellectual property and commitments on investment (Akyüz, 2005a: 2). In many developing countries as deindustrialization has occurred the share of services has risen at much lower levels of industrial productivity and per capita income in a context of erratic and slow growth. Akyüz therefore argues that it would be incorrect to assume that middle-income countries could achieve the income levels of highly industrialized countries through rapidly expanding into services, before achieving industrial maturity (Akyuz, 2005b: 38). History demonstrates that the services sector takes over and a benign process of de-industrialization occurs at considerably higher income and productivity levels than those achieved by middle-income countries (Akyüz: 37).

As the tariff simulations have shown, a Swiss formula with a coefficient of 15, would lead to new bound tariffs of around 10% for all tariff lines, which is a very low level and would prevent the use of tariffs as policy instruments. Even flexibilities that would exempt 5% of the tariff lines or allow for a lower reduction on 10% of the tariff lines would not be enough to provide governments the needed flexibility. Moreover, these paragraph 8 flexibilities[12] are fixed and cannot be changed over time when industrial development requires different protections. Therefore, the basis should be to identify developmental and industrial needs and strategies for each country and liberalize accordingly, while retaining broad flexibilities to accompany the process of industrial development.

Moreover, the ILO Global Employment Agenda (GEA), which promotes the creation of decent and productive employment, would be severely compromised by high tariff reductions on a line by line basis. These reductions will not only increase the competitive pressures on wages and working conditions, but will also impede the ability of trade to create productive and decent employment. The first core element of the GEA (ILO, 2003), "promoting trade and investment for productive employment and market access for developing countries" states that:

> One fundamental condition for unleashing the job creation potential of trade and investment in developing countries is a shift in the export base from primary commodities to manufactured goods and modern services by promoting appropriate physical infrastructure and the required skills of the labour force in an appropriate trade regime in which exports are promoted. This, moreover, can extend beyond a mere blanket prescription. Indeed, a useful role of the Global Employment Agenda could be to help developing countries identify industries in which they have or could develop a distinctive comparative advantage, and to assist in marshalling the resources that countries need to move up the value chain. The ILO's main concern is to ensure that trade liberalization leads to pro-poor, decent employment growth (ILO, 2003: 5).

It is exactly this role of identifying industries in which countries have or can develop a comparative advantage and assist countries in moving up the value chain that will be severely compromised by the impacts of the current NAMA proposals.

Trade Union Strategies Adopted in NAMA Negotiations

Given the likelihood the NAMA agreements would cause widespread negative effects on employment and industrial development in developing countries, the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), a number of ITUC affiliates, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions for the Americas and the Caribbean (ICFTU/ORIT) and the International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF) and its affiliates have undertaken various actions and research in order to avoid any unbalanced and possibly disastrous outcome in NAMA.

The ITUC affiliates, which have led the trade union response to NAMA have been the COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) and the CUT (*Central Única dos Trabalhadores*, Unified Workers Confederation) from Brazil. Other affiliates subsequently became active on the NAMA negotiations such as HMS (*Hind Mazdoor Sabha*, Trade-union Federation) in India, CGT (*Confederación General del Trabajo de la República Argentina*, General Confederation of Labour), KSBSI in Indonesia (The Confederation of Indonesia Prosperity Trade Union), the

TUCP (Trade Union Congress of the Philippines) and the UGTT (*Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail*) in Tunisia.

In South Africa, detailed research work was done by COSATU on the line by line impacts of tariff reductions under a Swiss formula with different coefficients and has shown that the currently proposed NAMA flexibilities would not nearly be sufficient to shelter the sensitive lines in South Africa. In fact, the current proposed percentages would almost need to be doubled to cater to South Africa's sensitive lines. South Africa will be particularly affected by tariff reductions in NAMA, given their tariff and industrial structure, including its small average tariff overhang[13].

As part of the Jobs and Poverty[14] campaign, NAMA has become a key issue in South Africa, and several demonstrations, rallies, pickets and actions, including in front of the EU and US embassies took place in 2006. In 2005, COSATU was part of the official government delegation at the Ministerial meeting in Hong Kong. Again in June 2006, COSATU delegates joined other trade unionists in a mini-ministerial meeting in Geneva.

COSATU is also part of the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) in South Africa, which is a tripartite structure including government, labour, business and community, in which trade and trade policies are discussed in the Trade and Industry Chamber, one of the four NEDLAC Chambers. The Trade and Industry Chamber has subcommittees to provide mandates for trade negotiations, including NAMA, agriculture and services. COSATU and affiliates have worked intensively in these committees, including on an analysis of the impact of current WTO proposals on over a thousand tariff lines (COSATU, 2006a).

At the ninth COSATU Congress in September 2006, a resolution was adopted on trade measures including NAMA (COSATU. 2006b) which calls upon the government not to accept any kind of compromise multilateral 'formulas' for the reduction of industrial tariffs, with the already evident negative effects of such liberalization on local industry and jobs (i.e. no tariff reductions should be accepted that would have negative effects on the local industry and jobs, just for the sake of getting an agreement); to preserve its own internal policy-making rights and the policy flexibility required to support its own emerging and future industrial development and diversification strategies; and to sup-

port COSATU's demand that the offensive thrust of NAMA be definitively blocked altogether.

COSATU has also played an important role at the international level in raising the awareness of the impacts of NAMA on employment and development, and in prioritizing NAMA. At the sectoral level, SACTWU (South African Clothing and Textiles Union) and NUMSA (National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa) have been particularly active in terms of research and mobilization given the substantial impacts of NAMA negotiations on employment in these sectors.

In Brazil, research on NAMA and the potential impacts for the Brazilian economy and employment has had a large impact on the action taken around NAMA subsequently. One trade union representative was delegated to the Brazilian mission in Geneva. This resulted in the preparation of a paper on the impacts of NAMA on Brazil (Observatorio Social, 2005), which was released shortly before the Hong Kong ministerial meeting in December 2005. Furthermore, several statements have been prepared and letters have been written to the Minister over the last two years in respect to NAMA, which include demands for not trading off NAMA for agriculture.

In India, the trade union movement and labour organizations, such as the HMS and the Centre for Education and Communication (CEC) have undertaken research on the impact of NAMA on three different sectors (fisheries, auto and leather). They have engaged with the government on NAMA and made specific requests with regard to the government position on NAMA, and recently reached out to other Indian trade union centres for campaigning around the issue of NAMA.

The CGT in Argentina has put a team together of several people that jointly work on different trade issues, at both the bilateral and multilateral level. They also have engaged with the government on NAMA and have now started to identify sensitivities in the different industries. At the same time, both the KSBSI Indonesia and the TUCP Philippines have identified NAMA as an important issue and have started to engage with the government on the issue. The TUCP also held a national workshop on NAMA in order to identify research needs and to further engage with the government on NAMA. Furthermore, there has been outreach to some of the sectors that will be affected by NAMA negotiations. Other trade unions expressing concerns with the current NAMA

proposals have been the NUNW in Namibia and UGTT in Tunisia.

The trade unions of all the countries voicing opposition to the current agreement have formed the NAMA 11 trade union group, which closely monitors negotiations, analyzes proposals, exchanges information and research, organizes joint activities, engages with the NAMA 11 governments and identifies further research needs. A NAMA 11 trade union statement has been prepared by the group, addressing the NAMA 11 governments and requesting a stronger position on coefficients and flexibilities. At the regional level the ICFTU regional office in Latin America, ORIT, has taken up NAMA as an important issue in its work and has mobilized a number of Latin American unions from Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama and Uruguay.

At the international level, both the ITUC (formerly known as the ICFTU) and the IMF (International Metalworkers' Federation) have been active on NAMA and NAMA campaigning. The IMF has held regional and international meetings on NAMA at which its affiliates developed statements that have been used in campaigning activities both nationally and internationally. IMF affiliates in Brazil, Argentina, South Africa and India have been most active and engaged in research. Solidarity calls have come from IG Metal in Germany and FLM (Metalworkers' Federation) in Italy. The ITUC, through the Trade, Investment and Labour Standards (TILS) meetings started NAMA work in April 2005, with a special session on NAMA and the preparation of a background paper on NAMA (see ICFTU, 2005). This was followed by the distribution of a model letter for governments. NAMA was a priority issue for the ICFTU during the Hong Kong Ministerial meeting in December 2005.

The TILS meeting of April 2006 concluded that NAMA developments were going in an unacceptably inequitable direction for developing countries following the decision in Hong Kong to adopt a Swiss formula, so the union movement should oppose the negotiations in their present form. Subsequently, the ICFTU issued a circular and model letter and a number of affiliates from industrialized and developing countries took up the trade union demands with their governments. The ICFTU also took a position strongly critical of current negotiations in its media releases. During this period, the ICFTU undertook NAMA

tariff simulations for 13 developing countries (see ICFTU, 2006).

At the ICFTU's Executive Board meeting in June 2006, the Board further reinforced the TILS conclusions, calling on all ICFTU affiliates to take effective action to influence the WTO Doha Round by supporting higher coefficients and increased exemptions for developing countries in the NAMA negotiations and genuine concessions by industrialized countries in the agricultural trade negotiations. The Board directed the General Secretary to coordinate trade union action to oppose completion of the NAMA negotiations on their current basis, ahead of the end of July deadline.

Accordingly, over the June-July WTO negotiating period, the ICFTU undertook intensive actions on the basis of the Executive Board's decisions, including a call for action on NAMA with a model letter, a "Q&A" guidance for affiliates on the technical aspects of NAMA; and assistance for developing country unionists' lobbying at WTO meetings in Geneva over that period. Simulations of the 13 countries were also shared with affiliates in these countries and led to increased work on NAMA in some countries. ICFTU statements and interventions at the international level also stressed the potentially very disruptive effects of NAMA negotiations for employment, working conditions and future development.

A workshop on NAMA (and GATS) was organized in September 2006 in Geneva[15]. This workshop was attended by some 30 trade unionists and has led to follow up work in a number of countries. During the TILS meeting in March 2007, a meeting between NAMA 11 negotiators and NAMA 11 trade unions took place, followed by a press conference and substantial press coverage. This was followed by a meeting between NAMA 11 ministers and NAMA 11 trade unions in June 2007. A resolution on NAMA was adopted by the ITUC General Council at the June meeting, calling upon "the ITUC secretariat and its affiliates, and regional trade union organizations, to increase action and lobbying on NAMA in support of developing country affiliates and the NAMA-11 trade unions, with particular attention to the time preceding a possible end of July NAMA agreement" (ITUC, 2007).

The NAMA Trade Union campaign has continuously developed over the last two years. It has become clear though that effective pressure is important when it comes to key decision-

making moments in the WTO, and that trade unions need to be prepared for such moments. Strong support needs to be provided to the trade unions in countries that are targeted in the NAMA negotiations, in particular the NAMA 11 and Latin American trade unions. Given the pressure coming from the developed countries, particularly the EU and the US, trade unions in those countries could play an important role by questioning the demands made by their governments.

Conclusions and Recommendations

NAMA tariff reductions, on a line by line basis, with a low coefficient and limited flexibilities, do not take into account the different tariff and industrial structures of countries, the different stages of development countries are at, the development challenges and industrial developmental needs of the countries concerned, the currently high levels of unemployment and underemployment, or the high adjustment costs these reductions will entail. A low coefficient will not only lead to cuts in applied rates as has been shown by the simulations. It also leads to large reductions of bound tariffs to very low levels, without the possibility of adjusting these levels upwards, therefore limiting countries in pursuing diversification and value-added production. The currently proposed flexibilities are very low and too rigid. They allow for certain tariff lines to be exempted from tariff cuts or to be subject to lower tariff cuts, however, they do not allow for the necessary changes in the future. As a country develops over time it will have different tariff needs.

NAMA negotiations as part of the Doha Development Agenda should start from a domestic development perspective that is based on what is needed in terms of trade policy measures and not the other way around, in which trade liberalization commitments determine the national development outcomes. NAMA proposals should be based on an average reduction, and not a line by line reduction. If the current mandate is to be respected, however, a sufficiently high coefficient should be applied to the tariffs of developing countries, which allows them future policy flexibility. Moreover, flexibilities should be substantially increased and allow for current and future sensitivities to be fully respected. With respect to employment challenges, in particular, such flexibilities should allow for labour intensive industries and the creation of productive employment and decent work to be taken fully

into account.

Beyond these employment and developmental concerns, the tariff reduction demands by developed countries and current proposals are not in line with the Doha mandate and the principle of less than full reciprocity. Moreover, the HK Declaration[16] paragraph 24 states that there should be a similar level of ambition (i.e. level of tariff reductions) in the Agriculture and NAMA negotiations, which is not respected either. A number of NAMA 11 communications clearly shows that these principles are not respected in the NAMA negotiations[17]. Moreover, the push for new market access does not take into account the unilateral liberalization that many of the developing countries have undertaken.

Given the far reaching impacts of NAMA negotiations and the unbalanced approach in the negotiations, trade unions need to step up the campaign against the current NAMA framework, both in the countries that will be affected by the tariff reductions, as well as in developed countries, as a sign of solidarity. Trade unions in countries that are subject to tariff reductions have to work on the identification of tariff lines that are sensitive in terms of current and future employment. They should, however, bear in mind that a broader strategic approach is required. The work in these countries should include the identification of priority sectors, including from a gender perspective, as part of an industrial development strategy. Such a strategy should also take into account the positions governments take in bilateral trade negotiations. There is a strong need to avoid commitments that restrict industrial policies and broader development policies.

It is furthermore important that trade unions understand the impacts for future industrial development. Even if tariff reductions do not have an immediate impact on employment, such future effects should not be underestimated, especially as commitments are irreversible. The issue of adjustment has to be addressed in greater detail, as this is an issue of great importance to mitigate the effects of liberalization and to distribute the pains and gains of liberalization more equally.

APPENDIX

Table 1: Average Applied Tariff (First Column) and Bound Tariffs (Second Column)

Sector / Country	Textiles		clothing		Leather		Footwear		Chemicals		Wood Products		Paper Products		Fabricated Metal Products		Plastic Products		Rubber Products		Automobiles		Furniture		Machinery	
Argentina	20	35	20	35	20	35	20	35	9.9	21.2	8.1	28.4	13.3	35	14.8[1]	35	13.7	22	15	35	27.9	35	17.7	35	8.2	35
Brazil	17.3	35	17.3	35	20	35	19.6	35	6.6	24.1	7.9	20.4	11.5	33.2	17.2	33.8	11.5	21.8	15	35	19.4	31.7	18	32.8	10.7[2]	32.8
Colombia	18	35	20	40	20	35.3	20	35.7	8	35	11.9	35	13.1	35	10	35	16	35	14.3	35	25.3	35.3	17.7	35.2	7	35
Costa Rica	14.9	45	15	45	14.8	44.1	13.9	54.8	2.7	43.3	7.5	42.1	5.9	46.2	2.1	45	3.9	36.2	6.3	44.9	8.45	56	13.4	42.2	1.2	41.2
India	13.5	31.4	20.2	42.3	15.4	35.2	15.4	35.2	13.7	43.7	12.2	38.6	15	39.4	15	39.5	15	40	14.7	35.6	24.8	35.8	15	35	14.3	28.2
Indonesia	11.7	30	14.9	35	12.3	40	12.3	40	3.6	37.9	4.5	40	3.7	39.6	10.2	40	12.8	40	12.8	40	28	38.9	11.3	39.7	1.9	38.8
Mexico	31.3	35	35	35	34.9	35	34.9	35	9	34.9	15.6	34.8	10.3	33.8	16.8	35.6	13.8	34.8	27.4	35.9	8.9	38.9	16.9	35	5.8	35
Morocco	40	41.2	49.9	40	50	40	46	40	15.3	39.7	30	39.2	45.4	39	27.8[3]	39.6	32.9	39.9	42.8	39.8	26.8	39.6	47.8	40	5.7	37
Peru	20	30	20	30	12	30	20	30	8.2	30	10.4	30	10.3	30	9.9	30	7	30	7	30	9.4	30	10.4	30	7.8	30
Philippines	9.1	30	15	30	13.3	50	13.3	50	3.7	25.6	7.1	24.7	6.4	31.6	7.2	30	11.5	30.4	8.3	23.8	24	24.8	11.9	39	2.7	26.3
South Africa	22	25	39	44	21	23	30	30	12	13	14	17	9	10	16[4]	20	16	24	21	26	33	50	20	23	16	23
Tunisia	40.4	60	40.3	60	42.3	57.3	na	na	13.6	53.2	28.2	37.7	33.7	41.4	36.4	37.5	14.3	32.8	37.9	37.2	11.6	33.4	na	Na	11.6	27
Uruguay	20.7	35	20	35	20	35	20	34	9.5	21.7	8.1	17.8	12.9	34.4	16	35	13.2	22.2	15	34.1	15.5	33.9	17.7	32.5	7.3	35

ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions), June 2006
Data for South Africa provided by COSATU
Data for Brazil provided by CUT/OS

1. Iron and steel products
2. Capital goods
3. Metals
4. Metal products

Table 2: New Bound Rates with a Swiss Formula with a Coefficient of 15

Sector / Country	Textiles	Clothing	Leather	Footwear	Chemicals	Wood Products	Paper Products	Fabricated Metal Products	Plastic Products	Rubber Products	Automobiles	Furniture	Machinery
Argentina	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	8.8	9.8	10.5	10.5	8.9	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5
Brazil	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	9.2	8.6	10.3	10	9	10.5	10.4	10.2	10.4
Colombia	10.5	10.9	10.5	10.6	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5
Costa Rica	11.3	11.3	11.2	11.8	11.1	11.1	11.3	11.3	10.6	11.2	11.8	11.1	11
India	10.2	11.1	10.5	10.5	11.2	11.8	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.6	10.6	10.5	9.8
Indonesia	10	10.5	10.9	10.9	10.7	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.8	10.9	10.8
Mexico	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.4	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.8	10.5	10.5
Morocco	11	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.8	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.7
Peru	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Philippines	10	10	11.5	11.5	9.5	9.3	10.2	10	10	9	9.3	10.8	9.5
South Africa	9.4	11.2	9.1	10	6.9	7.9	6	8.6	9.2	9.5	11.5	9.1	9.1
Tunisia	12	12	11.9	Na	11.7	10.7	11	10.7	10.3	10.7	10.4	na	9.6
Uruguay	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.4	8.9	8.2	10.4	10.5	9	10.4	10.4	10.3	10.5

ICFTU, June 2006

Table 3: Percentage Reduction in Applied Rates with a Swiss Formula with a Coefficient of 15

Sector / Country	Textiles	Clothing	Leather	Footwear	Chemicals	Wood Products	Paper products	Fabricated Metal Products	Plastic Products	Rubber Products	Automobiles	Furniture	Machinery
Argentina	50	47	47	47	11	-	20	29	35	30	62	41	-
Brazil	39	39	47	47	-	-	10	42	22	30	46	43	3
Colombia	45	45	48	48	-	-	21	-	34	27	58	41	-
Costa Rica	24	25	24	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	-
India	24	45	32	32	19	3	28	28	28	28	57	30	31
Indonesia	15	30	12	12	-	-	-	-	15	15	61	4	-
Mexico	66	70	70	70	-	33	-	38	62	24	-	38	-
Morocco	70.3	78	78	76	29	64	76	-	67	75	60	77	-
Peru	50	50	17	50	-	4	3	-	-	-	-	4	-
Philippines	-	33	13	13	-	-	-	-	13	-	61	9	-
South Africa	57	71	56	66	42	44	33	47	43	55	65	55	43
Tunisia	70	70	72	Na	14	62	68	71	28	72	11	na	17
Uruguay	49	48	48	48	7	-	20	34	32	31	33	42	-

ICFTU, June 2006

Table 4: New Bound Rates with a Swiss Formula with a Coefficient of 30

Sector / Country	Textiles	Clothing	Leather	Footwear	Chemicals	Wood Products	Paper Products	Fabricated Metal Products	Plastic Products	Rubber Products	Automobiles	Furniture	Machinery
Argentina	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.2	12.5	14.6	16.2	16.2	12.7	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.2
Brazil	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.2	13.2	15.7	15.7	15	12.8	16.2	15.6	15.6	15.8
Colombia	16.2	17.1	16.2	16.3	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.1	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.2
Costa Rica	18	18	17.9	19.4	17.7	17.5	18.2	18	16.4	18	19.5	17.5	17.4
India	15.3	17.6	16.2	16.2	17.8	16.9	17	17.1	17.1	16.3	16.3	16.2	14.5
Indonesia	15	16.2	17.1	17.1	16.7	17.1	17.1	17.1	17.1	17.1	16.9	17.1	16.9
Mexico	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.1	16.1	15.9	16.2	16.1	16.1	16.9	16.2	16.2
Morocco	17.3	17.1	17.1	17.1	17.1	17	16.9	17.1	17.1	17.1	17.1	17.1	16.6
Peru	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Philippines	15	15	18.8	18.8	13.8	13.6	15.4	15	15.1	13.3	13.6	16.5	14
South Africa	13.6	17.8	13	15	9.1	10.8	7.5	12	13.3	13.9	18.7	13	13
Tunisia	20	20	19.7	Na	19.2	16.7	17.4	16.7	15.7	16.6	15.8	Na	14.2
Uruguay	16.2	16.2	16.2	15.9	12.6	11.2	16	16.2	12.8	16	15.9	15.6	16.2

ICFTU, June 2006

Table 5: Percentage Reduction in Applied Tariffs with a Swiss Formula with a Coefficient of 30

Sector / Country	Textiles	Clothing	Leather	Footwear	Chemicals	Wood Products	Paper Products	Fabricated Metal Products	Plastic Products	Rubber Products	Automobiles	Furniture	Machinery
Argentina	20	20	20	20	-	-	-	-	8	-	42	7	-
Brazil	6	6	19	17	-	-	-	13	-	-	20	13	-
Colombia	15	15	19	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	8.5	-
Costa Rica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
India	-	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34	-	-
Indonesia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	-	-
Mexico	49	54	54	54	-	-	-	5	41	-	-	5	-
Morocco	57	66	66	63	-	43	63	-	48	60	36	64	-
Peru	25	25	-	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Philippines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	44	-	-
South Africa	38	55	38	50	24	23	17	25	17	34	44	35	19
Tunisia	50	50	54	Na	-	41	49	54	-	56	-	na	-
Uruguay	22	20	20	21	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	12	-

ICFTU, June 2006

Table 6: Formal Employment Figures: Various Years

Sector / Country	Textiles	Clothing	Leather	Footwear	Chemicals	Wood Products	Paper Products	Fabricated Metal Products	Plastic Products	Rubber Products	Automobiles	Furniture	Machinery
Argentina (2004)	30,737	21,516	7,684	21,516	54,556	20,747	16,905	16,136	33,809	na	23,052	15,368	43,030
Brazil (2004)	799,662	Included in textiles	393,184	Included in leather	304,838	251,762	133,427	292,592	320,099	Included in Plastics	321,445	294,324	457,522
Colombia (2003)	27,075	92,903	4,028	10,309	50,658	na	19,523	15,695	33,602	Na	4,756	12,954	14,810
Costa Rica (2004)	4,663	15,547	2,062	Included in leather	11,081	6,449	4,339	9,477	7,839	Included in Plastics	2,721	14,626	5,634
India (1999)	1,471,000	144,000	39,000	35,000	653,000	38,000	131,000	254,000	63,000	118,000	447,000	4,000	349,000
Indonesia (2001)	678,670	462,223	284,511	Included in leather	212,519	407,855	115,297	116,972	292,267	Included in plastics	48,676	300,519	49,214
Mexico (2004)	270,600	701,900	234,200	Included in Leather	258,100	117,300	94,800	336,600	290,300	Included in Plastics	522,600	379,900	84,700
Morocco (2000)	69,621	134,930	4,952	9,566	35,974	7,436	8,738	16,956	11,690	2,901	13,823	2,796	5,992
Peru (2004)	30,100	80,900	24,100	-	26,100	3,600	3,000	19,100	15,700	Included in Plastics	6,700	51,000	10,500
Philippines (2004)	96,000	370,000	69,000	Included in Leather	66,000	142,000	41,000	111,000	56,000	Included in plastics	39,000	143,000	64,000
South Africa (2003)	55,846	114,933	8,916	17,785	29,474	46,812	52,476	111,277	45,554	22,398	77,886	38,473	90,278
Tunisia (2000)	12,259	109,695	3,322	Na	11,032	1,876	6,099	9,548	8,486	2,690	9,385	na	6,944
Uruguay (2003)	6,148	4,744	3,846	Included in leather	6,311	1,707	1,723	3,223	2,916	Included in plastics	2,221	1,415	1,606

ICFTU, June 2006

Table 7: Changes in Real Income under Scenario 5

Country /Region	Change in real income ($US)
China	10.6 bn
India	2.3 bn
Vietnam	1.8 bn
Rest ASEAN	1.7 bn
Middle East And North Africa	1.4 bn
Brazil	828 m
Central America And Caribbean	702 m
Indonesia	644 m
South Africa	281 m
Rest of South Asia	268 m
Argentina	248 m
Mexico	227 m
Rest of Latin America	214 m
East Africa	- 27 m
Bangladesh	- 32 m
Rest of Sub Saharan Africa	- 84 m

Source: Polaski, 2006: 26

Endnotes

1. Trade Policy Officer, International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) Geneva Office. E-mail: esther.busser@ituc-csi.org.
2. Swiss Formula: (Tb*c) / (Tb+c)=Tb new
   Tb= current bound tariff ; c=coefficient
3. WTO Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001.
4. The Doha Work Program was adopted by WTO members at the Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001 and provides the mandate for the negotiations between members. The original mandate has been refined by work at Cancún in 2003, Geneva in 2004, and Hong Kong in 2005. Paragraph 16 specifically sets out the mandate for the negotiations on Non-agricultural Products.
5. The tariffs that have been set at maximum levels and bound in the WTO.
6. The actual tariff rate in effect at a country's border.
7. Besides policy considerations, such high reductions of the bound tariffs are not in line with the principle of "less than full reciprocity" that is part of the Doha mandate, which requires that developed countries make higher reductions than developing countries. A Swiss formula with a low coefficient (of 15) will result in high reductions for developing countries (between 60 and 70 per cent) and much lower reductions for developed countries (between 20 and 25 per cent).
8. Data sources on applied tariffs are from the UN Tariff and Market Access Database (UN TARMAC) and on bound tariffs from the consolidated tariff schedule of the WTO.
9. The countries in the tables include Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Morocco, South Africa, Tunisia, Uruguay, India, the Philippines, Mexico, Indonesia and Peru.
10. Based on the G-20 proposal for Agriculture Tariff reductions.
11. GTAP is a general equilibrium model that includes linkages between economies and between sectors within economies.
12. The July 2004 Framework provides for flexibilities for developing countries. They can either exempt a percentage of tariff lines from tariff reductions or apply half of the tariff reductions to a percentage of the tariff lines. The percentages that have been proposed so far are 5% exemption or 10% lesser reduction. These percentages have not been agreed upon however.
13. Tariff overhang occurs when the bound tariff exceeds applied tariff, a phenomenon which occurs more frequently in developing countries. In developed countries, the bound and applied tariffs are often the same.

14.The COSATU Jobs and Poverty Campaign was launched in 1999 and focuses on the ongoing job losses, high levels of poverty and growing inequality. NAMA negotiations have been one area of attention in this campaign.
15.The workshop was organized with the assistance of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Geneva
16.At the sixth WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong in December 2005, ministers adopted a Declaration covering all the Doha negotiating areas, including NAMA
17.TN/MA/W/68; NAMA 11 Submission comprehensive proposal on NAMA modalities 15 June 2006; NAMA 11 Statements of 2 February, 20 March and 30 June 2006; NAMA 11 Ministerial Communiqué of 29 June 2006.

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